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Abstract. This article examines the effects of role on terrorists’ use of power and affiliative
strategies in negotiation as a function of terrorist ideology, incident type, and the outcome that
is achieved. Data were scores on eight behavioral scales designed to reflect the dynamics of 186
terrorist negotiations, as reported in detailed chronological accounts. Results supported the
hypothesized one-down effect with terrorists’ use of power-oriented strategies complemented
by authority’s use of affiliation-oriented strategies. The extent to which terrorists used aggres-
sive strategies was related to the resolution of the incident, with attenuated outcomes more likely
for those using more aggressive strategies. These dynamics differed across incident type, with
aerial hijackings involving more overt power strategies than barricade-siege incidents, which
were more likely to involve bargaining for certain outcomes. Finally, terrorist ideology and the
associated identity concerns magnified the one-down effect, with religious fundamentalists
engaging in more violence and less compromising strategies than terrorists with other ideo-
logical backgrounds.
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In a recent paper, Donohue and Taylor (2003) reviewed seven lines of research
that provided data about the effects of role on strategy use in negotiations.
Central to each line of work was evidence for a one-down effect. Specifically,
negotiators who saw themselves as having fewer options than their opponents
were more likely to resort to aggressive strategies as a way of seeking change
in the power structure. The emphasis of these negotiators’ dialogue was on
defending a personal position by attacking the other party’s social legitimacy
and attempting to force the other into unnecessarily yielding on critical issues.
In contrast, negotiators who perceived themselves as having a greater number
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of options were less threatened by the power structure of the situation and, con-
sequently, were more likely to risk their social identity with affiliative and con-
ciliatory dialogue. In other words, the role associated with the less powerful,
“one-down” position typically fostered use of competitive, aggressive mes-
sages as a means of shifting power, even though that strategy can be least effec-
tive in reaching agreement (Levine and Boster 2001).
The purpose of this article is to explore this effect in the context of terror-
ist hostage-taking and negotiation. Data used to examine the role effect were
derived from 186 descriptive accounts of terrorist incidents collected from the
chronologies compiled by Mickolus and his colleagues (Mickolus 1980, 1993;
Mickolus, Sandler, and Murdock 1989; Mickolus and Simmons 1997). The
accounts selected contained sufficient descriptive material to enable a coding
of the power and affiliative behaviors that occurred during the incidents as well
as a coding of the way in which the incident ended. Of greatest interest are role
differences exhibited by the various kinds of terrorists involved in these inci-
dents. To understand these role differences, this article begins with a review
of the literature that is perhaps most informative about the terrorist negotiation
context. The article then considers these findings in the theoretical framework
of the one-down effect, and uses this review to form hypotheses about the
effect of role on terrorists’ behavior and incident outcome.
Hostage Negotiation Research
Early research into terrorist hostage-taking highlighted the interdependence
between parties’cooperative and aggressive behavior and how this influences
the dynamics of incidents. For example, Corsi (1981) used decision trees to
show that acts of force by both terrorists and authorities can influence the
response of the other party, as well as shape how the incident unfolds. By sys-
tematically modeling these relationships, other researchers (e.g. Sandler and
Scott 1987) have noted the importance of complementary and reciprocal
dynamics in the bargaining process between terrorists and authorities. As
might be expected, these dynamics also associate differently with the possible
outcomes of terrorist incidents. For example, in their descriptive analysis of
politically motivated attacks, Friedland and Merari (1992) found relationships
between factors such as the degree terrorists were armed and their subsequent
commitment to the act. Finally, in developing this research from a psycho-
logical script perspective, Wilson (2000) highlighted the importance of nego-
tiators’ identity, as measured by differences in terrorist group, on the type of
behaviors terrorists are prepared to use and the outcomes that they achieve.
More direct evidence of how role influences these behavioral relations
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comes from research that focuses on the various language strategies used in
hostage negotiation. For example, Donohue and Roberto (1993) studied com-
munication strategies across 10 actual incidents in which police negotiators
talked to hostage-takers with a variety of different role backgrounds (i.e.
experienced criminals, mentally disturbed, domestic problems). The results
indicated that the police negotiators controlled the amount and pace of the dis-
cussions and the topics that were considered. The police were also more
likely than the hostage-takers to use collaborative relational messages that
show support and provide information, whereas the hostage-takers were
significantly more likely to use power strategies such as threats, demands, and
language containing negative affect. Thus, while police negotiators sought to
control interactions by controlling the emphasis on dialogue, they also recog-
nized the need for affiliative messages to manage the disparity in power be-
tween the two parties.
Rogan and Hammer (1994) used another set of hostage negotiations to
explore the importance of identity or facework in negotiations. Facework
focuses on the issue of controlling one’s identity and threatening the others’
identity in an attempt to alter the individual’s view of him or herself as being
competent and in control of the situation. Rogan and Hammer discovered that
the police negotiators relied heavily on trying to restore the hostage-taker’s
face (i.e. used language to portray the hostage-taker in positive terms) while
the hostage-takers relied more on restoring their own face or making them-
selves look strong and in control. Thus, the perpetrators were much more
focused on defending their own identities than the police negotiators, who
showed little concern for personal identity and concentrated more on trying to
support the perpetrators’ identities.
In further exploring the importance of identity within role differences,
Donohue and Roberto (1996) found that the hostage-takers in authentic con-
texts used more distributive or power-seeking strategies, made more demands,
and proposed fewer integrative or win-win options than the hostage-takers or
police negotiators in simulated contexts. Although these simulations were con-
ducted by actual police negotiators, the role effect was not as significant as that
found with actual hostage-takers, presumably because negotiators in simulated
sessions have a lower commitment to their identity. The actual hostage-takers
were significantly more interested in protecting their identities than individu-
als in any other category of negotiation.
The possibility of role orientations influencing negotiators’ language choices
is also evident in Taylor (2002a), who showed that messages typically orient
around avoidance (withdrawn), distributive (competitive) and integrative (co-
operative) approaches to interaction. Taylor argued that these broad orienta-
tions emerge from negotiators’ interpersonal predispositions and personal
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role expectations in the conflict, and showed that their characteristic behaviors
formed a single dimension running from extreme crisis to normative problem
solving. Consistent with Donohue and Roberto (1993), Taylor demonstrated
that those negotiators holding firm to specific orientations tend to use com-
munication behaviors that seek to aggressively increase power or concede
power to open dialogue to more normative problem solving. Moreover, Taylor
found that negotiators generally adopt consistent orientations to instrumental
(task-focused), relational (trust and liking-focused), and identity (identity or
face-focused) concerns at any one time, reasserting the central importance of
roles to many aspects of negotiation dynamics (Wilson and Putnam 1990).
Theoretical Explanations for the One-Down Role Effect
Based on this hostage negotiation research and findings from other contexts
reviewed by Donohue and Taylor (2003), it appears that negotiators who see
themselves as having fewer options in comparison to their opponents often
seek to regain power through competitive, attacking dialogue, even though that
strategy can be least effective in reaching agreement (Levine and Boster
2001). Hostage-takers, buyers, union negotiators, low-power political groups
and husbands in a divorce negotiation rely on more power-oriented messages
to promote a more competitive and more power-focused negotiation context.
The emphasis of their dialogue is on gaining control in the interaction by
attacking the other party’s social legitimacy and attempting to force the other
into unnecessarily yielding on critical issues. In contrast, the hostage nego-
tiators, sellers, management negotiators, high power international negotiators,
and wives use a broader range of communication choices including more
affiliative and interest-focused messages. Because these negotiators have
more options available that do not impinge on their overall position, they feel
able to risk their social identity with more open and conciliatory dialogue.
The regulation of control and its attendant focus on power is an often used
theoretical tool for explaining negotiation processes (Bacharach and Lawler
1986) as well as behavior in other interpersonal contexts (Bales 1970; Leary
1957; Mahalik 2000; Schmidt, Wagner, and Kiesler 1999). For example, the
concept of losing control is the most widely accepted explanation for domes-
tic violence in which violence emerges as a strategy for regulating control that
has been threatened in some way (Eisikovits, Goldblatt, and Winstok 1999).
According to this perspective, the extent to which the regulation of control
becomes necessary depends on the prominence of identity. For violence to
emerge there needs to be a high degree of concern and commitment to the
social and personal identity that underlies an individual’s position. Individuals
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must value their identities, integrate them into all aspects of their social life,
and work to defend them often. In order to defend their identity, individuals
must also recognize norms and values in the social context that sanction vio-
lence as an acceptable and appropriate means of restoring one’s identity.
Being competitive and power-focused, or integrative and affiliation-focused,
must be viewed as a normatively-sanctioned strategy for identity management.
Finally, individuals need to frame situations in a way that calls for the use of
violence or power strategies. That is, they must work to actively structure the
situation so that power, threats, or violence are viewed as a legitimate response
to that situation. Thus, for negotiators whose personal or professional lives
grow from their identity as competent negotiators, situations that threaten con-
trol need to be perceived in such a way that power messages are seen as a legit-
imate way of responding to restore identity. The focus is on the identity and
on the legitimization of force to restore it.
The importance of regulating control and power suggests that achieving
symmetrical power may reduce the magnitude of the one-down effect. Pfetsch
and Landau (2000) focus on the effect of power symmetry in international
conflict. They contend symmetry is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
successful negotiations. Properties of symmetry/asymmetry largely describe
the relative potential power and strength of parties and thus power-role status.
Patterns of role behavior along these dimensions are seen in the process of
negotiation – lower-power parties will seek to negotiate on equal terms as the
stronger party by cultivating non-material resources (e.g. actor, joint, proce-
dural, issue-related techniques, etc.). Again, the lower-power party is likely to
concentrate more on non-substantive issues as a means of equalizing power
and reestablishing identity. In this context, police negotiators often talk about
the need to quickly restore the hostage-taker’s identity as a means of focusing
on substantive issues (Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, and Ramesh 1991).
However, role differences can also emerge from non-identity based biases
(see Putnam and Holmer 1992 for a review). For example, Neale, Huber and
Northcraft (1987) found that the assignment of negotiator roles, such as seller
or buyer, was sufficient to cue gain and loss frames. Negotiators playing the
role of sellers tend to view an outcome as a potential gain (i.e. those in an offen-
sive role), and typically make more concessions and engage in more informa-
tion seeking behaviors than buyers who tend to hold a negative frame. Negative
frames are linked to escalation of conflict, potential impasse, strikes, and
third party intervention. Negotiators entering interactions with negative frames
are somewhat more likely to engage in defensive facework and somewhat less
likely to engage in protective facework than are people entering negotiations
with cooperative frames. For example, research indicates that buyers are more
likely to have a negative frame than sellers, which is consistent with evidence
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suggesting that buyers typically use more distributive behaviors than sellers
(Drake 2001; Morley and Stephenson 1977).
The notion that power and expectations interact is evident in Olekalns and
Frey’s (1994) study of buyer-seller negotiations, in which framing was shown
to be exaggerated by differences in power. High power positively framed and
negatively framed negotiators are significantly advantaged by an imbalanced
negotiation market in their favor. The interaction between expectations and
perceptions of power may also account for the longer term oscillation between
integrative and distributive behavior use reported by Druckman (1986).
Evidence suggests that expressions of positive affect reverse the one-down
phenomenon, prompting bargainers with positive frames to take advantage
and engage in more risk seeking, more non-agreement, and less concession
making than negotiators with negative frames. In other words, when a nego-
tiator in a powerful offensive role perceives significant benefits to using the
power, they may well use their advantage. This prompts an aggressive counter-
response from the low-powered defender, which in turn forces the offensive
negotiator to adopt more cooperative strategies to avoid a crisis or breakdown
of the interaction. This pattern of interdependence may presumably continue
indefinitely, so long as interactions do not cross a threshold of extreme hostility
that leads to a breakdown irrespective of any subsequent cooperation (Taylor
2002b).
Using the Role Effect to Understand Terrorist Negotiations
This review suggests that the one-down role effect of increased aggression dur-
ing negotiation revolves around three key issues. First is the issue of power
complementarity. In comparison to the other party, terrorists find themselves
in a role that imposes more constraints on their ability to control the negotia-
tion process and attain their desired outcomes. This reduced power places the
terrorist in a one-down position that becomes more prominent over time as
authorities develop tactical and negotiation positions. The response of many
terrorists is to adopt this one-down position and threaten or actually use vio-
lence to generate fear, coercion, or intimidation in an effort to realign the bal-
ance in power (Russell, Banker, and Miller 1979). However, not only is the
power structured differently, but also the strategic responses to the discrepancy
are typically complementary. That is, the one-up party (e.g. the authorities)
generally responds to this discrepancy with less aggression and more affilia-
tive strategies.
However, associated with the one-down effect is a limit to power comple-
mentarity that comes in the form of attenuated outcomes. If terrorists adopt a
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cooperative orientation to interaction, then the parties are able to develop nor-
mative dialogue that retains power complementarity and achieves better out-
comes. In contrast, terrorists that adopt the one-down position are less likely
to secure their desired outcomes because the increased aggression discourages
the one-up party (i.e. authorities) from helping the other maximize gains. In
particular, when the one-down party’s behavior becomes extreme, then the
one-up party often withdraws affiliation in favor of more aggression (Alex-
androff 1979).
Second is the prominence of identity. For individuals more committed to
sustaining their role identities for their professional or personal pursuits, such
as terrorist and police negotiators, a key goal is to vigorously defend that pub-
lic identity. Central to the beliefs and attitudes that form the terrorists’ identity
is an ideology (Crenshaw 1988; Hoffman 1999). A terrorist’s ideological per-
spective provides a set of beliefs about the external world that not only fosters
an identity around commitment to a cause, but also shapes expectations about
the rewards of terrorism and dictates the extent to which the terrorists’ goals
are dependent on the cooperation of the authorities.
Although every terrorist has an individual identity, researchers have
identified three major ideological perspectives (Hoffman 1999; Post, et al.
2002). The nationalist-separatist seeks to establish a geographically separate
political state based on either ethnic or political criteria (e.g. Irish Republican
Army, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). These terrorists are
often accountable to a developed criminal organization and are both trained
and experienced in the terrorist role. The ideology itself is generally an
extreme example of the beliefs and backgrounds of the immediate social
group, such that these communities treat the role of terrorist with respect and
importance (Silke 2003). However, because the community’s beliefs also dic-
tate the legitimacy of the terrorism, violence is typically planned, only used as
necessary, and more likely to be directed away from harming innocents.
The social revolutionist uses terrorism as a way of drawing attention and
applying pressure on the authorities to promise changes in social or economic
order (e.g. Japanese Red Army). These terrorists necessarily possess a degree
of interdependence with the authorities because their goals focus on fighting
for improvement or change in a system of which they are already part. By
using the threat of killing hostages as a bargaining tool, these terrorists expect
to force authorities to compromise on a position or make concessions in sup-
port of their cause. However, since one of their aims is to gain support for the
revolution, they are likely to avoid levels of aggression that would serve to
reduce the publics’ sympathy (Wilson 2000).
Radically different from the two secular groups is religious fundamentalist
terrorism, which is viewed as a “sacramental act” carried out in fulfillment of
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some theological order (Hoffman 1999). While the focus of secular terrorists
is on using terrorism to change some aspect of the current political or social
order, the religious terrorist seeks to cause damage directly to a society. Their
role is one of an extreme martyr figure who, in making an honorable sacrifice,
would expect to receive both social recognition and rewards in the afterlife
(Silke 2003). This set of goals means that religious terrorists have a clear out-
group mentality and are likely to show little interdependence with authorities
or hostages. They consider themselves as being at “total war”, such that
greater use of violence is not only morally justified but a necessary expedient
for the attainment of their goals (Hoffman 1999).
The third issue is individual bias from situational, task, and frame perspec-
tives. The one-down role effect appears most likely to emerge when a number
of individual biases start to develop. For example, when individuals define the
task as revolving around a single issue they remove options for more collab-
orative trade-offs and more nuanced views of the conflict. Also, more aggres-
sive strategies emerge when individuals perceive that violent means of
addressing the issues are socially sanctioned, and they enter the conflict with
a fixed sum bias and a negative frame. As noted by Corsi (1981), the propen-
sity for these dynamics to emerge will vary across the types of terrorist inci-
dents, since each type differs in terms of its setting, the available possibilities,
and the way in which the interaction is played out. In this study, where the data
are aerial hijackings and barricade siege incidents, these differences are likely
to affect the degree terrorists use power-gaining and affiliative strategies.
Specifically, the mobile nature of some aerial hijackings means that they are
associated with extreme time-critical interactions, where the traditional attri-
tion approach to negotiation is not necessarily appropriate or possible. In such
contexts, negotiators often focus on the prominent alternative and take a more
aggressive approach to interaction in an effort to reach a conclusion (Donohue
et al. 1991). Moreover, the confined context of the aerial hijacking may lead
hostage-takers to perceive themselves as being under greater threat from tac-
tical strategies. Again, the response is to use power strategies that make overt
threats in an attempt to discourage such actions.
Hypotheses
To test the role effect in the terrorist negotiation context it is useful to focus on
the power and affiliation negotiation strategies displayed by terrorists and their
negotiation counterparts. These strategies are coded in the incident reports
used as the dataset for this study. Power moves are defined as aggressive
attempts to gain leverage in the incident. Affiliation moves are defined as direct
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attempts to cooperate and bargain for suitable outcomes.
Based on these concepts and the issues that drive the one-down effect we put
forward the following hypotheses:
• H1: Terrorists who reject the one-down role effect and rely more on affilia-
tion moves by spending more time negotiating and showing a willingness
to make concessions are more likely to secure their desired outcomes.
• H2: Terrorists who respond with the one-down effect will resort to power
strategies as a way of seeking change in the power structure and are less
likely to secure their desired outcomes.
• H3: Religious fundamentalist-oriented terrorists who are more personally
committed to their identities are more likely than the other two terrorist
groups to resort to power strategies as a means of seeking change in the
power.
• H4: Aerial hijackings are more likely to involve overt power strategies
compared to barricade-siege incidents, which are more likely to involve
bargaining for certain outcomes.
Method
Data Sample
Data were 186 descriptive accounts of terrorist incidents collected from the
chronologies compiled by Mickolus and his colleagues (Mickolus 1980, 1993;
Mickolus, Sandler, and Murdock 1989; Mickolus and Simmons 1997). The
accounts selected contained sufficient descriptive material to enable a coding
of behaviors that occurred during the incidents as well as a coding of the way
in which the incident ended. 100 of these accounts were aerial hijackings in
which the perpetrators took control of an airplane or helicopter for a sustained
period of time. The remaining 86 accounts were barricade-siege incidents in
which the perpetrators took control of a public building (e.g. embassy) or a pri-
vate location (e.g. bank). The selected incidents took place between 1968 and
1991, and were located in over 50 different countries. The incidents were
reportedly committed by both autonomous perpetrators and perpetrators
affiliating themselves with known terrorist organizations including the Black
Panther Party, Islamic Jihad, the Irish Republican Army, and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These affiliations allowed the incidents
to be grouped according to whether they were associated with a nationalist-
separatist, social revolutionary, or religious fundamentalist ideology (Post 
et al. 2002).
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A content analysis of the descriptive accounts revealed a number of vari-
ables that reflected overt power moves and affiliative acts within the terrorist
incidents. These behaviors were identified through a grounded approach to cat-
egorizing descriptions in which the coding scheme was continually expanded
and refined until it effectively reflected the behavior of both terrorists and
authorities (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Holsti 1969; Krippendorff 1980). The
behavioral variables were scored in a dichotomous format as either absent 
(or information missing) or present across all of the 186 incidents. This
method of analyzing the data was adopted following previous research
findings (Taylor, Bennell, and Snook 2002; Wilson 2000) that show a dichoto-
mous approach as effective in producing interpretable results from descriptive
material whilst minimizing the opportunity for subjective and unreliable cod-
ing of the data.
The behavioral variables were found to form eight scales on which the ter-
rorist incidents could differ. These scales focused on differences in negotiation
behavior, but also reflected the other actions used by parties within the broader
context of the terrorist attack. Table 1 reports the final eight scales with a
definition of the categories that constitute each scale. Four of the scales depict
power moves and were scored such that higher scores reflect more aggressive
attempts to gain leverage in the incident. For example, the Control scale
depicts terrorists’ treatment of their hostages during the incident and runs from
no attempt to control to killing of a hostage. Two of the scales depict the degree
of affiliation shown by the terrorist and are scored with higher scores reflect-
ing more direct attempts to cooperate and bargain for a suitable outcome. 
For example, the Negotiate scale runs from no dialogue to conciliation and so
captures the extent to which terrorists are prepared to engage in substantive
problem-solving. The remaining two outcome scales reflect the actions of the
authorities in response to the terrorists. The Force scale measures the extent
to which authorities carried out tactical behaviors beyond negotiation, with
higher scores representing the use of more aggressive strategies during the
incident. The Capitulation scale depicts the extent to which authorities com-
plied with terrorists’ demands and goals and was calculated so that higher
scores reflect larger concessions.
Reliability of the transcript coding was assessed by having one independent
coder apply the coding dictionary to descriptions of the aerial hijackings and
a second coder apply the scheme to the barricade-siege incidents. The reliabil-
ity of coding, measured at the individual behavior level with Cohen’s Kappa
(Cohen 1960), was .64 with 75 percent agreement for the Control scale (Range
= .52 – .82); .87 with 92 percent agreement for the Damage scale (Range = 
.76 – .94); .74 with 76 percent agreement for the Demands scale (Range = 
.55 – .85); and .84 with 91 percent agreement for the Use of weapons scale
(Range = .83 – .87). The two affiliation scales showed similar levels of relia-
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Table 1. Definitions and scoring methods for power, affiliation, and outcome scales.
Behavioral Scale Description Scores
Power Scales
0 = No control
Extent to which the terrorists 2 = Tied or gagged
Control controlled or mistreated their 1 = Threatened
hostages during captivity. 3 = Physically harmed
4 = Killed
Extent to which the terrorists 0 = No damage
Damage damaged the infrastructure of 1 = Threaten damage
the plane or building being used. 2 = Non-deliberate damage
3 = Deliberate damage
Number of the following 0 = No demands
demanded by the terrorists: 1 = One demand
Demands asylum, general and specific 2 = Two demands
release of prisoner, money, 3 = Three demands
publicity, travel, or other. 4 = Four demands
5 = Five demands
Weapon use Conditions in which the 0 = No use
terrorists used their weapons. 1 = In response
2 = Spontaneously
Affiliation Scales
0 = No dialogue
Extent to which terrorists 1 = Dialogue
Negotiate interacted with Authorities 2 = Negotiation
to reach a resolution. 3 = Suggest alternative
4 = Conciliation
0 = Retention
Extent to which terrorists 1 = Release Women / Children
Release released hostages during 2 = Release some passengers
the incident. 3 = Release All passengers
Outcome Scales
Extent to which Authorities 0 = Attrition
Capitulation conciliated with terrorists 1 = Offers
to reach a resolution. 2 = Concessions
3 = Allowed escape
Extent to which Authorities 0 = No strategy
Force use aggressive strategies to 1 = Containment
resolve the incident. 2 = Tactical raid
3 = Terrorists killed
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bility with Kappa equaling .97 with 98 percent agreement for the Conciliate
scale (Range = .80 – 1.00) and .69 with 75 percent agreement for Negotiation
scale (Range = .62 – .76). Finally, the reliabilities of the outcome scales were
.79 with 88 percent agreement for the Capitulation scale (Range = .62 – .95)
and.67 with 83 percent agreement for the Force scale (Range = .60 – .76).
According to Fleiss (1981), a Cohen’s Kappa of .40 to .60 is fair, .60 to .75 is
good, and greater than .75 is excellent. Thus, these results indicate that the
scales developed from the coded descriptions of the incidents are reliable.
Results
A preliminary analysis of the interdependence among the scales revealed a
positive correlation for power (Mean r = .23) and a positive correlation for
affiliation (Mean r = .30), but no relationship between power and affiliation
(Mean r = .03). The small correlation between the power and affiliation meas-
ures was principally due to the power-orientated Demand scale, which corre-
lated positively with both of the affiliation scales (Mean r = .30). Recalculating
the correlation between the power and affiliation scales with the Demand 
scale removed revealed a negative relationship between the two dynamics 
(r = –0.37).
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 that examine the impact of the terrorists’behav-
ior on the incident resolution, we correlated the power and affiliation scales
with the two outcome measures. Table 2 presents non-parametric correlations
(Spearman’s rho) that were calculated without taking into account cases in
which both scale scores were zero (i.e. no behavior occurred). This modi-
fication is a common approach to dealing with accounts where the absence of
a given behavior may not be taken as a definite indication that the behavior did
not occur but only that it was not reported as having occurred. By ignoring
joint non-occurrences, the correlations minimize the possible error created by
this ambiguity and so are likely to provide a more accurate picture of the inter-
relationships among behaviors (e.g. Bennell and Canter 2002; Taylor, Bennell,
and Snook 2002).
Consistent with predictions, the data presented in Table 2 indicate that the
use of power and affiliation behaviors by terrorists have quite different asso-
ciations with the degree that authorities capitulate. Of the power-orientated
strategies, violently controlling hostages, damaging the building or aircraft,
and extensively using weapons were all associated with lower levels of con-
cessions from the authorities. The exception to this trend was the correlation
for the Demand scale, which suggested a positive relationship between mak-
ing more demands and concessions by the authorities. In contrast to the over-
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all negative correlations associated with the power scales, terrorists’ use of
affiliation strategies correlated positively with authorities’ behavior. Both
increases in terrorists’willingness to negotiate and their willingness to give up
hostages were significantly associated with more concession-making by the
authorities. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1, negotiators who take a more
problem-orientated approach to the negotiation achieved better outcomes.
Correlations in the second column of Table 2 test the hypothesis that ter-
rorists’ use of aggressive behavior will influence the way authorities respond
(Hypothesis 2). The correlations indicate that terrorists’ use of aggressive
strategies had a mixed effect on whether or not the authorities reciprocated
with force. Specifically, higher levels of controlling behavior and weapon use
were both related to greater use of force by the authorities, but the opposite was
the case for the Damage and Demand scales. This suggests that the authorities
may respond to attempts to gain power with personal aggression, but only after
the occurrence of certain types of behavior, and not to a significant degree. In
particular, only scores on the Control scale showed a significant correlation
with the Force scale, which is consistent with the view that authorities will
resort to aggressive tactics if hostages are being physically harmed or killed
(McMains and Mullins 2001). This is a key exception to the role effect. The
effect generally reveals a complementary behavioral pattern with the one-
down participant demonstrating increased aggression while the one-up respon-
dent is generally more affiliative. In the case of response to extreme terrorist
power strategies, respondents appear to engage in reciprocal rather than com-
plementary behavior.
Table 2. Pearson’s distribution free correlation (rho) for behavioral scales by Authority’s
behavior.
Authority’s Behavior









NOTE: * p < .05 (two-tailed).
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Consistent with the expected complementary behavioral pattern of the role
effect, the relationship between terrorists’ use of affiliative behaviors and
authorities’ use of force was overwhelmingly negative. Both a greater will-
ingness to negotiate and a greater willingness to release hostages showed a
significant negative association with the Force scale, suggesting that the
authorities were unlikely to use aggressive strategies when terrorists’were not
acting to change the power structure of the situation.
Examining Hypothesis 3, Table 3 reports the mean score for each of the
power and affiliation scales as a function of ideology, where the highest mean
score is shown in bold. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, religious fundamen-
talists showed greater levels of aggressive strategies than both nationalist-
separatist and social revolutionary terrorists on all but the Demand scale.
Specifically, non-parametric one-way ANOVA’s (Kruskal-Wallis 1952) rev-
eled significant differences among the three groups in the degree of violence
towards hostages, H (2,183) = 9.59, p < .05, the degree of damage during the
incident, H (2,183) = 7.49, p < .05, and the use of weapons during the inci-
dents, H (2,183) = 13.17, p < .05. For all three scales, post-hoc comparisons
(Marascuilo and McSweeney 1977) revealed that religious fundamentalists
used significantly higher levels of aggression than social-revolutionists
(respectively, c = 37.8, 30.5, and 40.6, p < .05) and higher but non-significant
levels of aggression compared to nationalist-separatists (respectively, c = 20.9,
15.5, and 21.3, p > .05). In terms of affiliative behavior, there was a significant
difference among terrorist groups in their willingness to conciliate, H (2,183)
= 11.21, p < .05, with religious fundamentalists being significantly less 
likely to release hostages compared to nationalist-separatists (c = −41.0, p <
.05) and social revolutionists (c = −21.7, p < .10). There were no significant
differences across the three ideologies in the willingness to use negotiation 
(H < 1, ns).
Finally, the predicted differences (Hypothesis 4) among aerial-hijackings
and barricade-siege incidents were examined by calculating the mean score for
each of the power and affiliation scales as a function of incident type. Table 3
gives these means and reports in bold the larger of the scores between barri-
cade-siege and hijacking incidents. A series of Mann-Whitney U tests across
incident type revealed that aerial hijackers were significantly more likely to
inflict damage to the incident location compared to perpetrators of barricade-
sieges (U = 3441.0, z = −2.63, p < .05) and that hijackers had a non-significant
tendency to make greater use of their weapons than barricade-siege perpetra-
tors (U = 4035.0, z = −0.82, p > .05). In contrast to the hijackers focus on vio-
lence, perpetrators of barricade-siege incidents typically asserted power
through verbal demands (U = 3546.0, z = 2.19, p < .05). They also showed a
non-significant tendency to support these demands by threatening and carry-
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ing out threats on the hostages compared to hijackers (U = 3894.0, z = 1.17, 
p > .05). Consistent with this focus, barricade-sieges involved significantly
more negotiation than aerial hijackings (U = 3545.0, z = 2.15, p < .05) and
were significantly more likely to involve the release of hostages than aerial
hijackings (U = 3291.5, z = 2.92, p < .05).
Discussion
The data generally provide support for the three key dimensions of the one-
down effect in the context of terrorist negotiation: a) complementary strategy
Table 3. Mean scale scores as a function of terrorist ideology.
Terrorist ideology
Behavioral Nationalist- Social Religious





















NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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use with the one-down party behaving more aggressively and, as a result,
achieving attenuated outcomes, b) the prominence of identity that can magnify
the role effect, and c) the impact of situation on individual biases that affect the
degree and type of behavior.
Specifically, the first dimension of the effect holds that those who define
themselves in the one-down role and resort to aggressive strategies as a way
of seeking change in the power structure are less likely to obtain the outcome
they desire. In contrast, terrorists who spend more time negotiating and show-
ing a willingness to make concessions are more likely to secure their desired
outcomes. Interestingly, in the context of terrorist attacks, the behaviors that
increase affiliation between the parties and led to better outcomes included
Table 4. Mean scale scores as a function of incident type.
Type of incident





















NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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making excessive demands. Although this contradicts our expectations from
other forms of negotiation where making excessive demands is considered an
aggressive strategy, authorities in intense conflict situations may conceivably
view any form of dialogue as cooperative and a helpful inroad to resolving the
incident.
Regarding the prominence of role identity, when compared to nationalist-
separatists and social-revolutionaries, the terrorists with a religious ideology
typically used more aggressive strategies. This use was pervasive across the
different kinds of aggressive strategies, which is consistent with the idea that
these terrorists aim to maximize fear and threat rather than use these dynamics
to achieve some other goal. Consistent with this notion, religious terrorists en-
gaged in very little affiliative behavior compared to nationalist-separatists and
social-revolutionaries. This unwillingness to engage in normative interaction
illustrates the religious terrorist’s lack of interdependence with the system they
are attacking and their determination to achieve a set of goals without giving
consideration to alternatives (Silke 2003). These findings suggest that identity
plays a significant role in the evolution of terrorist negotiations and, conse-
quently, that it is important to understand the cultural and social background
of those terrorists authorities engage in negotiation.
However, it is important to note that there were some important variations
across the hijacker and barricade-siege roles. Compared to barricade-siege
incidents, hijackers typically i) used more overt aggression as a means of shift-
ing power; ii) tended not to engage in negotiation; iii) tended not to use threats
to the hostages as a way of gaining leverage in the incident or negotiation, and
iv) were less likely to make concessions, presumably because they were less
prepared to engage in any form of bargaining to obtain a certain outcome. The
focus of aerial hijacks was on overt aggression to maximize the threat of the
situation and force the authorities into capitulating. In contrast, the barricade-
siege incidents were focused on more indirect attempts to change the power
structure combined with normative bargaining for a resolution.
Perhaps the most significant implication of these findings is that in extreme
circumstances the role effect takes some interesting twists. In less extreme con-
ditions, such as buyer-seller negotiations, the one down effect generally reveals
more conciliatory behavior from the higher-power party. The higher-power
party experiments with reaching out to propose more negotiated options while
focusing on the substantive nature of the conflict. However, in the current
findings, when the lower-power party (i.e. the terrorist) engaged in extreme
aggression, the higher-powered authorities quickly reciprocated with tactical
attempts to resolve the dispute.
One explanation for this role-effect twist comes from research in game the-
ory. Some studies in this area have explored the relative impact of small and
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large discrepancies in initial power between subjects. Research supports an
“inverted U-shaped” relationship between relative threat capacity (how much
each side can harm the other’s position) within a bargaining game and indexes
of contending (e.g. counterthreats, penalty use, unwillingness to yield to a
threat). Hornstein (1965) and Vitz and Kite (1970) found that contending was
more prominent when there was mild discrepancy in threat capacity than
when there was equal or highly unequal threat capacity. Hornstein, in partic-
ular, provided evidence that the low-power negotiator was unwilling to accept
lower status in the mild discrepancy condition, and fought for equal treatment
(i.e., followed threats with aggressive behavior) to a much greater extent than
when confronted with a highly unequal discrepancy.
This discrepancy-size explanation would predict that terrorists who per-
ceive mild discrepancies in power levels would be more willing to use highly
contentious and deadly strategies to equal power whereas those who perceive
highly unequal threat capacity would be more willing to negotiate. Does this
finding suggest that an important strategy for fighting terrorism is continuous
muscle-flexing by the higher-power party to discourage terrorist aggression?
There is considerable debate about the appropriateness of using force in gen-
eral to combat terrorism, with critics highlighting that such action can confirm
the terrorists’ self image as heroic martyrs, increase the demand for revenge,
and potentially add to those who identify with the cause (Enders, Sandler, and
Cauley 1990; Seger 2003). However, within the context of negotiating with
terrorists, it may prove a useful strategic complement to traditional attrition-
focused techniques.
Future research examining the role effect in a terrorist context ought to ex-
tend into more in-depth analyses of actual terrorist incidents. For example, in
the current analysis we implicitly viewed the behaviors of terrorists as lead-
ing to certain “responses” by the authorities. However, the actions of author-
ities and terrorists are necessarily intertwined, such that an authority’s actions
are likely to have an equally significant effect on the strategies terrorists’ per-
ceive as useful to pursue and the way they expect the authorities to react. The
result is that certain actions by the authorities will work to lower the aggres-
sion used by terrorists, while others may shift the focus of aggression away
from afflicting damage and towards attempts to control the bargaining process.
Extending this line of argument to the longer-term, we might also consider the
possibility that terrorists’ initial behaviors are shaped by expectations derived
from authority’s responses to previous incidents.
Understanding how negotiators influence one another during the bargaining
process could be addressed by obtaining actual interactions between terrorists
and authorities to gain a more refined understanding of how these negotiations
evolve. The data set examined here offers only secondhand accounts of activ-
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ities in these incidents, and the utility of the analysis hinges on whether the
behavioral scales adequately capture the complex dynamics of the interaction
(Mickolus 1987). Actual interactions would provide a far more detailed pic-
ture of how terrorists and authorities define and implement their roles. Far
from being a mere academic exercise, the development of such a body of
knowledge can be of direct use to negotiators and policymakers attempting to
save lives in terrorist crisis negotiations.
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